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‘THE PEOPLE’S POWER’
(DEMOCRACY) AS
AN ARGUMENT IN FINNISH
PARTY MANIFESTOS

1. ‘The Peoples Power’ (*kansanvalta*)
and Democracy (*demokratia*)

The Finnish language has two separate translations of democracy, or of the Swedish *demokrati*. This apparently trivial fact gives me an opportunity to study the relationships between word, concept and vocabulary. The first word, *kansanvalta* (‘the people’s power’, or rule by the people), is a fairly direct translation from the ancient Greek. The other and later term is the more academic *demokratia*, which illustrates a typical Finnish strategy of coining new words by giving a morphologically new Finnish form to foreign words (such as post -> *posti*; bank -> *pankki*; dictator -> *dikttaitori*).

My interest in *kansanvalta* does not derive primarily from an interest in the concept of democracy as such but from my work with the Finnish concept of power (*valta*) (Hyvärinen 1997,1998,1999). Why then study a totally different concept of democracy? I hope
that I can somehow investigate the tricky relationships between a
good, a concept and particular vocabularies by using this opportu-
nity given by two separate expressions for the same concept. What I
suggest is that local words can resist or selectively adapt connota-
tions of internationally shared concepts precisely because of their
local translations and their particular lexical ties.

The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of the word ‘democ-

Goverment by the people; that form of government in which the sov-
ereign power resides in the people as a whole, and is exercised either by
directly them (...) or by officers elected by them (...) b. A state or com-

The first point of diversion, as Russel L. Hanson has noticed, lies in
the difference between the Greek *demos* and the English ‘people’, the
first referring more to the ‘ordinary people’. The Finnish *kansa* has
both of the meanings, even if its ‘ordinary people’ covers a much
larger part of the population than *demos* did.

The most significant differences are related to the different levels
of abstraction of these terms: ‘democracy’ or *demokratia* do not in-
vite their dictionary definitions or the concepts of ‘the (ordinary)
people’ or ‘power’. However, *kansanvalta* does. Because of its clear
lexical ties it is far less malleable for abstract formulations. Participa-
tory democracy or democratic management or leadership cannot
properly be translated with *kansanvaltainen*, the adjective *demo-

The problems of democracy within the EU are not discussed in terms a deficit
of *kansanvalta* but in terms of a deficit of *demokratia*. As a very gen-
eral rule, one could say that after the 1960s and 1970s, *demokratia*
has become more urban, international, intellectual and leftist in its
connotations, where *kansanvalta* tends to be more national, tradition-
mental, rural, and bourgeois. These ‘synonymous’ expressions seem
thus to have, at least partly, different conceptual and lexical surround-
ings, and thus different uses and different histories.

The particular properties of the term ‘the people’s power’ derive
from the multiple and smoothly overlapping meanings of the Finnish
word ‘kansa’. The first thing to note is that Finnish language does not make a difference between the concepts of folk and the people. Thus, kansa refers both to the whole population and all of the voters. In the old usage, kansa referred simply to the members of the Estate Diet, as a counter-concept of Monarch or Grand Duke. It can have the meaning of ‘ordinary people’ as against all economic, urban or political elites. It can allude to an ethnic and linguistic whole, as if it were a single, national character struggling with foreign nationalities. When we add this multi-valence of ‘the people’ to the concept of ‘power’, a new array of possibilities opens up. ‘The people’s power’ may be seen as a popular power, a power of poor people, a power of a nation, a power of an ethnic totality – or in similar terms of fair and open process as democracy is often conceptualized. To conclude, the term suits well in populist rhetoric, be it nationalistic, leftist, or agrarian.

The second purpose of this article is to demonstrate the merits of conceptual history in the study of such relatively trivial or worn source materials as party manifestos, which do not contain the nuances of the works of the great theorists. This focus on a very narrow section of potential material and contemporary debates has its problems and risks by evaporating the actual contexts, on the other hand it seems to offer important visions of the diachronic change of concepts.

As my source material, I use the relatively comprehensive and computerized corpus of party manifestos collected at the University of Jyväskylä by Eeva Aarnio (based on the work by Olavi Borg, 1965). When reading the party manifestos, I am not particularly interested in their impact on the consequent action of the parties, aside from further programs, rather I see them “as action, as a genre, which is used to interpret the political culture of a certain point of time” (Aarnio 1998, 21).

2. Kansanvalta before the Republic

Democracy and ‘the people’s power’ were not self-evident values or points of departure for political or moral evaluation before the foundation of Finnish Republic in 1918 – nor even immediately after the birth of the new state.
‘The People’s Power’

In written Finnish, the concept surfaces for the first time during the era of Swedish rule in a statute dating from 1794, and then in an entirely pejorative form:

... to leave room for the unbridled and infectious lunacy of the people's power (Dictionary of Old Literary Finnish, II, 259).

Interestingly, this old formula does not use the genitive form but a typically Finnish strategy of coining compound nouns, making a word like ‘folk-power’. The noun does not, therefore, emphasize the possessor of the power but its essential quality as lunacy. In the 20th century, this same strategy of naming various powers by compound nouns is basically reserved only for the deviations of legitimate the people’s power.

From 1809 onwards, until the declaration of independence in 1917, the provinces that currently comprise Finland belonged to the Russian Empire as the Grand Duchy of Finland. Finland inherited its constitution and Estate Diet from the Swedish period, but the Grand Duke did not summon the Diet between 1809 and 1863. Until the Crimean War (1854-56), the Russian authorities had a strongly restrictive policy against the use of written Finnish except in religious literature, disregarding a short period of Finnish publicity around 1848-50. Knowing these restrictions and the diligence of the Russian censorship, it is understandable that such republican words as ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’s power’ were not in used lavishly.

The emerging Finnish nationalism and interest in the Finnish language, culture and history did not, at first, take Russian impact as its target. The cultural and political attack was directed against the hegemony of the Swedish language and Swedish-speaking elite. However, for many Swedish-speaking intellectuals, the national awakening meant an obligation to learn to speak and write Finnish – a language that was not yet codified or much used in political or scientific texts. The opening of the Estate Diet, and its more or less regular meetings since the 1860s, gave the birth to the first party cleavage between the Finnish and Swedish ‘parties’. The Finnish Party found its support chiefly from the peasantry and clergy, whereas the aristocracy and bourgeoisie largely supported the Swedish side. Of
course, these ‘parties’ were far from modern mass organizations with their elected leadership and fixed membership, yet they shaped the public debates and struggles for parliamentary seats.

In particular, the Finnish Party was notoriously reluctant to establish any definite organization or formulate its objectives into the form of a program (Liikanen 1995; Koskinen 1904-1906, IV, 404-405). According to the self-understanding of the Fennomen (from ‘Fennomaniac’; ‘Fenno’ meaning Finnish), they were not establishing or representing a separate ‘party’ as such, but the common ‘national cause’, Finnish culture and language. This strategy of dissolving the divides between language, culture and state still lives in the word Finnish (suomalainen), which used to refer to the language group, and still refers both to ethnic origin and citizenship. This means that the term which was later chosen to refer to the citizens of the new state, earlier on referred to the Finnish-speakers, and to the loose party formation supporting the Fennification of the culture.

The Swedish-oriented intellectuals emphasized Swedish heritage, culture and language as the best protection against the Russification of the province. The opposing party was called ‘Dagbladians’ (according to the newspaper Helsingfors Dagblad). Instead of the language issue, this group emphasized political rights and identified itself as ‘liberal’ (Kurumäki 2003).

Instead of party manifestos, one should then look first at the programmatic articles of the Fennoman leaders. Yrjö Koskinen (1830-1903) was famous for his militant employment of language and insistence on demanding the use of Finnish in his presence. From the 1860s onwards, he was the most influential politician of the amorphous Finnish Party. His influential text Fennomania as a Political Party (1863; Koskinen 1904-06, II, 50-58) elevates “the Finnish people” as the key political figure. He also acknowledges how the “greatest power” resides in the hands of those who retard the Finnish cause. However, these themes are not linked to each other, and the concept of ‘the people’s power’ is not used.

In 1863, before the elections for the new estate Diet, Koskinen wrote a series of short articles to introduce the principles of representation to the Finnish audience. Koskinen resorts strongly to the British discussion and uses Jean-Jacques Rousseau mostly as a shocking contrast. Koskinen is careful not to advertise democracy or the
souvereignty of the people as such. He reminds his readers that Finland has a mixed government and the Grand Duke as the monarch. However, in one of these texts, Koskinen approached 'the people's power' as if it already were the existing state of affairs in the process of representation:

But since the power actually belongs to the people, and only has been given to a representative to exercise, it is natural that this power exercised by a representative may only last a stipulated time, and will return to the possession of the people" (Koskinen, op. cit., 162)

A few years later (1869), in a fierce debate on the Finnish department of a school, Koskinen was less careful in his formulation, even if he still avoided the direct use the word:

The question is already one of who should rule in this country, it is hardly that slight minority, whose standing relies on old social ills, or the majority of the people (Koskinen 1904-06, II, 585-6; Liikanen 1995)

Koskinen was accused of incitement to treason, which made him more careful for the next years. In 1879, Koskinen published his popular and programmatic book The Leading Ideas in the History of Humankind, which notifies 'the people's power' in the context of the Roman Republic, not among the consequences of the French Revolution or the challenges of contemporary politics. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that to Koskinen the concept was still secondary in comparison with language, nation and culture.

The theme of democracy finally entered the party programs in the form of challenging the Finnish term and questioning its conventional content. The Finnish translation of the first program of the Swedish-minded Liberal Party (1880) contains a complicated statement:

For the reason that misconceptions often occur with concern to the common power [principle of democracy], we wish to make a brief reminder here. Understood from a legal stance, this basic principle signifies the same as: every person's equality before the law, namely, equal rights for every person, high and low, poor and rich, to insist on their rights, and
also the same rights and duties, determined in the same proportion, towards the society. (Liberal Party, 1880. My italics in all further quotations)

The program attempts to do two things at the same time. On the one hand, it tries to define democracy strictly in terms of process and exclude all connotations of policy or material equality. Democracy thus means the dissolution of any estate privileges and the observance of equality before the law. On the other hand, the program wants to replace the established translation of ‘democracy’ with yhteisvalta, common power (cf. Europaeus, 1853; Ahlman 1865). Liberals were apparently annoyed with the way the Fennomen used the concept of (Finnish) ‘people/folk’ (kansa) to provide legitimacy for their own politics. They clearly did not endorse the power of the ‘ordinary people’ or the ‘folk-as-a-character of history’, as Koskinen conceived it. Thus, they tried – without much success – to give a new translation for ‘democracy’ by referring to the common use of power. However radical this move was, the Liberals did not take any version of the current demokratia into use. Even the Liberals needed the word of power (valta) to perform their conceptual opening and to coin the new term.

From the first meeting of Estate Diet in 1863 towards the end of the century, there was indeed an ongoing debate on the forms and processes of representation. However, no general consensus on the people’s power emerged. The Young Finns (Nuorsuomalaiset), a liberal-minded fraction of the Finnish Party, finally gave up their basic resistance to programs and published their own in 1894. In this program, the Party declares:

The party of Young Finns will in the future act, as it has done so long, in order to develop our political (valtioillisten) and social circumstances into a liberal and democratic (kansanvaltaiseen) direction. (Young Finns, 1894)

Even in this program, ‘the people’s power’ is not an absolute or clear state of being, but rather a principle which defines the direction of action. This direction is clarified in two ways. Firstly, the strengthening of the position of the Parliament is argued for with the help of ‘the people’: “We consider the harmony between the people
and the Government to be the guarantee of the success of this country”. Remarkably, this demand was presented in the context of “maintaining Finland’s inner independence”. Secondly, it is obvious that the program does not demand any immediate realization of democracy. In contrast, it presents detailed changes in the processes of electing the representatives of the clergy, bourgeoisie and peasantry. The sovereignty of the people is not declared, instead the program seems to be fully satisfied with the ‘common power’, both in the sense of harmony and the balanced representation of estates.

‘The people’s power’ was not a key concept for the Young Finns, and it disappeared entirely from their next program of 1906. The formative years of the Russian reduction of Finnish autonomy (1899-1905) had just passed, as had the General Strike of 1905. After the parliamentary reform of 1906, Finland had received a unicameral parliament with universal suffrage. ‘Legality’ and ‘constitutionalism’ had been key concepts in the resistance towards Russian policy, and the program of Young Finns was written strictly within the horizon of legality and constitutionalism. In that sense, the program is very constitutional, and demands the strengthening of the position of the parliament. The real problem was the ‘political’ or Russian issue, not the emerging ‘social issue’ attached to the growing working class movement.

The entire political field, however, had changed radically by the birth of two major mass political organizations. The Social Democratic Party practically copied its first program (1903) from the Austrian Social Democrats, and the Rural League published its first program in 1908. As a translation, the program of the SDP does not say a word about ‘the people’s power’. Interestingly enough, ‘the people’ and the ‘power’ almost meet each other in the program:

...and that the transformation of the means of production from private property into the people’s property must be its objective, conquering political power must be the instrument in the struggle to free the proletariat. (SDP 1903)

The SDP wanted to give the means of production to the people, but the proper and only owner of power in the divided society was regarded to be the workers. Political power was needed to transform
economy and society. In general, the program was not concerned with constitutional forms but rather with the division of social power and in ways of achieving the maximum influence of workers within the state. In this regard, the programs of the Young Finns and Social Democrats did not only assume different positions, they simply discussed totally separate social and political worlds.

The first program of the Rural League (1908) mentions the adjective *kansanvaltainen* just once, and does it within the context of school reforms. Democracy neither appears as a general horizon of objectives nor as a ground of legitimization of politics.

In 1917, the program of the Rural League already contained the demand that Finland must be “established as a republic”. This demand is still made in order to emphasize the power of the Parliament, not of the people. ‘The people’s power’ surfaces in a totally new context:

But then again, the society must guarantee an employer such conditions that under them he is able to make contracts as the manufacturer of the goods he produces in such a way that high-handed offenses against provisional labor contracts and other refusals and trouble-makings on the part of the workers can not take place without the law interfering with them. The interest of the entire Finnish society demands that industrial and productive peace shall be regulated by law, taking into account the terms of healthy, democratic (*kansanvaltainen*) development. (Rural League, 1914/1917)

‘Democratic’ (*kansanvaltainen*) is not used here as a counter-concept to the power of estates, monarchy or élite. Instead, it is used for the first time in party manifestos to criticize the politics of one part of the ‘ordinary people’. ‘Democratic’ begins here its future, successful career as a legitimizing concept. In the passage, a ‘democratic development’ is assumed to exist as the true background of the industrial and productive peace. This way of speaking, indeed, assumes, that a substantial amount of ‘the people’s power’ already exists, and that there already is a natural development that continuously increases it. For a long time, the leftist parties typically separated the *demands* for democracy and the *recognition* of its existence. The reference to the ‘interest of the entire Finnish society’ emphasizes that the ‘the people’s power’ is already regarded as an ordering power, which
means a critical attitude towards the disruption of industrial peace. The counter-concepts of democratic (kansanvaltainen) development comprise thus troublemaking and disturbance.

3. The Struggle for Hegemony: 1918-1945

Even though 'the people’s power' occasionally entered the party manifestos over the last years of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, its position was far from central. Surely one cannot conceive of it as a hegemonic horizon of understanding social and political power. Between 1918-19, two major conflicts and the establishment of the ‘highest power’ after independence (1917) changed this setting substantially. In the Civil War of 1918, the country was divided between the Reds (mainly supporters of the Social Democrats) and Whites (mainly bourgeois middle class and the land-owning peasantry). On the side of the defeated, the new Finnish Communist Party at first explicitly rejected the whole objective of 'the people's power'. The losers of the constitutional debate of 1918-19, the monarchists, had similar problems. The conservative National Coalition Party allowed 'the people's power' to enter its manifesto as late as in the 1950s, whereas the Swedish People's Party has never accepted the rhetoric of 'the people's power' in its programs. The republican parties, instead, now elevated the people's power as a key programmatic concept between the world wars.

The Rural League (1921) parallels the slogans of the republic and the people's power, and positions itself against the losers of both formative conflicts:

The republican form of government realized by the immense majority of the people, who have played a crucial part in its achievement, the Rural League will still defend and support it against all possible revolutionary attempts.

In order to support these objectives, the party also demands:

the development of a democratic political life that relies on the entire social strata. (Rural League 1921)
The objective of the people's power is no longer attached to any particular disputes but from this manifesto onwards the concept is set to define all objectives concerning the arrangement of the government. The concept is in use when legitimizing, strengthening and 'developing' the newly established power. Various reform objectives are attached to the tasks of the 'democratic (kansanvaltainen) state'. When discussing the need for cooperatives and economic sectors that require "developed high capital" the manifesto concludes that one

... must strive for transferring this high capital and the consequent, both economic and political, power to the people. (Rural League 1921)

This is one of the instances where the program withdraws from the purely constitutional discourse of power and considers the social relations of power. 'The people' functions now as the basis for legitimizing public power. This kind of democracy is not divided but it is the ordering and productive power of one people, realized with the help of the parliament. Similar demands for the 'democratization of the economy' were presented by the two smaller republican parties, the National Progressive Party (1918) and the People's Party (1932).

Social Democrats faced a more problematic situation. In the Civil War, they had been on the side of the defeated, whereas in the constitutional debate they belonged to the republican winners. In the end of the 1920s, the rising power of the right-wing popular movement, Lapuan liike, put Social Democrats into a new dilemma. To undermine the progress of the movement, they needed to alienate the Rural League from the movement, and thus, to take themselves more distance from the Communists. In order to constitute some common ground with the Rural League and other republican parties, a new position towards the people's power was needed. (Kettunen 1986, 307)

The contradictory attitudes towards the people's power can easily be seen in the three major programs the SDP approved in 1930. The SDP required the democratization of both the foreign policy and the army. The party demands democratization (kansanvaltaistaminen) without assuming any existing democracy in the field. With the army, the position was definite:
In the hands of the bourgeois, the army has developed into a power that threatens both the peace between nations and their internal democratic freedom. (SDP 1930)

Here Social Democrats subscribe to the very same democratic values as the Rural League and the People's Party, however they acknowledge that the people's power prevails in a sorely inadequate way. The Program of Socialization is fully located within the horizon of unevenly divided social power, and does not say anything about the people's power. In this program, the objective of the party is to abolish “the power of the capitalist class in the economy” and help workers achieve “as much influence as possible”. The most interesting of manifestos is still the Policy Program (Menettelytapasöjjet). In this manifesto, the party acknowledges the existence of political democracy (kansanvalta). The SDP here uses the old word valtiollinen for political, so they literally confirm the existence of democracy in the context of state.

Among the most significant preconditions for the successful political class struggle of the Social Democratic Party is political democracy, which the Party attempts to change from an instrument of the supremacy of the bourgeois classes into an instrument for the working classes to realize their goals. The Party strives for bringing political democracy as close to perfection as possible. By educating as much of the large masses of people as possible about the significance of democracy as an instrument of their social liberation, the Party strives for creating guarantees for preserving democracy. It interferes, in cooperation with other democratic parties if necessary, with the plans of certain bourgeois elements to limit the citizens' political rights or to destroy the democratic system. (SDP 1930)

Social Democrats make it clear that the people's power covers only the state, and definitely not the society. The link to the Hegelian idea of the state as a sphere of freedom is quite obvious (Pulkkinen 1998, 20-21). Nevertheless, even in the state, democracy is not yet ready but requires completion. Being democratic is also approved as a general principle, which can even unite various political parties against those who want to restrict the people's power. Yet the attitude towards the people's power is contradictory. At the end of the quotation, democracy is perceived as a general and positive goal, but in
the first sentence it is seen as an instrument – either as an instrument of bourgeois domination or as an instrument to achieve the goals of workers’ movement. In this asymmetrical comparison, democracy can be either a tool of condemned domination, or it can establish a strategic and teleological power to realize the good policy of workers (Räsänen, 1997, 77, 108). Political power (democracy) was a transformative force in Social Democratic thought: its purpose was always to transform the social relations of power. In this sense, a mere constitutional democracy was not an autonomous or absolute objective for Social Democrats.

The manifesto sees threats to democracy both in the Right and in the Communist movement. There is a constant need for enlightenment among the great masses. The objective of the education is to clarify the significance of the people’s power “as an instrument of their social liberation”. Again, social liberation is the primary value, and the shared point of departure in argumentation with the competing Communists. Finally, the program unmistakably recognizes its antagonists.

In this enlightenment work, first and foremost it is necessary to demonstrate that the nouveau Communist doctrine about the armed revolution led by the few, the minority dictatorship of the Communist Party, and creating social revolution with such resources, are ruinous delusions. (SDP 1930)

The opposites of political democracy, thus, comprise both the social power of the capitalist class, the minority dictatorship by the Communists, and the restrictions of the people’s power by the extreme Right.

4. The Critics of the Republic

The extreme left and right-wings on the political map negatively evaluated the republican constitution, but their criticism was exposed by employing diametrically opposite strategies. The Patriotic People’s Movement (Isänmaallinen kansanliike, IKL) considered that “Finland is a completely democratic (kansanvaltainen) state”. This portrayal of
the state of affairs did not prevent the party from proposing a thoroughly fascist system in which occupational representation would have replaced the old parliament. The role of the new occupational representation would have been merely advisory. The IKL also suggested an “extended suffrage” to the parents of extended families and well-educated people. The people of the IKL needed both enhanced breeding and education. The same programmatic direction is observable in the manifesto of the Finnish National Socialist League (1932). The National Socialists formulated the counter-concepts of the people’s power more explicitly than the IKL:

After democracy has been brought to rely on an occupational and professional parliament, parties that are based on different ideals become totally unnecessary as state organs, although they may appear even in the future as free organizations. (IKL 1930)

After proposing the use of referendum and citizens’ initiatives, the party crystallizes its program:

Hence, the people’s real power is put in the place of the purposeless party oligarchy. (IKL 1930)

The demand for ‘the real the people’s power’ was presented in the same year also by the People’s Party, but certainly without the same meaning. Practically all parties have used this idiom one time or another. The use of the idiom characterizes well a situation where the participants of a complex conflict have to subscribe to one and the same glorified concept. By using the philosophical distinction between the apparent and the real, new and even divergent ideas may be presented together with the affirmation of the basic values just by attaching the word ‘real’ to the valued term (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).

In the use by the extreme right, the people’s power is far from democracy. ‘The people’ is one solidified agent, which shall hold the power. The republic has, however, in a worrisome way, caused a splintering of this unbroken the people’s power and the birth of a divided ‘party oligarchy’. This has prevented the manifestation of the ‘real will of the people’. In various ways, the right-wing parties
wanted to open the constitutional debate, and reformulate the monarchist arguments. Räsänen (1998, 266-67) analyzed this position aptly: “The hatred between brothers, factionalism and selfish interests are contrary to the real the people’s power, where power is something sovereign, unanimous and undivided”, whereas “oligarchy involves the possibility of division of power, power struggle and different power blocks”. This sovereign, unanimous and undivided power was, indeed, the undeniable objective of all right-wing parties in the 1930s.

The Finnish Communist Party (SKP) assumed a reverse strategy in its founding meeting in Moscow right after the Civil War (1918). The manifesto, written largely by Otto Wille Kuusinen, maintains that “the revolutionary masses have lost their confidence in the former ways of struggle, goals and their leaders who have entered in the service of the imperialism”. This loss of confidence concerns, in a particularly bitter way, the demand for the people’s power. Now the workers need all power, and therefore their objective is “an iron dictatorship of the proletariat”. The manifesto explicitly declares that the people’s power is not the objective, “not before the revolution, and not through it”:

No longer it is even a question of the poor awakening and organizing the class struggle, the striving for a people-powered republic (kansanvaltainen tasavalta), but it is the goal of the proletariat to aim for the power of the proletariat; to seize all state and political power in its own hands. (SKP, 1918)

The style discloses an admiration for the victorious Russian Revolution and disappointment with the lost Finnish Revolution. A leather-jacketed commissar has replaced the mild parliamentarian as the ideal image. One cannot detect a trace of the horizon of democracy in the state, as cherished by the Social Democrats: the enemy is straightforwardly ‘a bourgeois robber state’. In this way of speaking, power is never just a chance, it has to be, in order to be effective, causal and deterministic domination (on Max Weber, chance and power, see Palonen 1998, 168-176). The people’s power would now refer to two precarious and objectionable things: either to the democratic principles that the genuine commissars do not follow, or to
the solidity of the people, which would create vain illusions about
the chances to cross the divide between bourgeoisie and the work-
ing class. Nevertheless, the real power can only be suppression and
dictatorship.

However courageous the manifesto was, it soon appeared that the
open cheerleading for dictatorship was not the perfect way to win
the support of the Finnish workers. The Communist Party was ille-
gal until 1944, therefore the Socialist Workers Party was established
for public action. Its manifesto (1920) tries to solve the problem by
a double strategy. The first step is to rename the old republic as a
dictatorship:

The bourgeois republic, the economic foundation of which lies on the
private ownership of the means of production, has never been a true all
the people’s power, neither has it been an impartial power that lies beyond
classes, but in reality it has remained a dictatorship of the bourgeois...
(Socialist Workers Party, 1920)

The argumentation begins with the almost self-evident premise
that the republic has never been the power of the whole people, nor
a neutral power. The argument leaves no room at all to the process
aspect of democracy or to possibly changing majorities, but quickly
concludes that republic has indeed been a dictatorship. When Social
Democrats emphasized the process and room given by the state, the
Communists reduced the power entirely to social categories, which
possess the power. Because of this reasoning, the Party concludes
that it is impossible to attain socialism with the help of republic.
Only Soviet power can be a solution. Workers’ councils, the pro-
gram concludes, are “the most general and democratic (kansan-
valtainen) mass organizations of the working majority of the peo-
ple”. Therefore, the new Soviet power was democratic after all. When
the SKP became public, and published its new manifesto in 1957,
this paradox of democracy and dictatorship was not solved but in-
tensified. The program proudly presents proletarian dictatorship to
be the highest form of the people’s power:

The transitional state is workers’ power brought to replace the power of
the minority dictatorship of the capitalist class; the power of the prole-
tariat. This state, that enforces the power of the people in its most ex-
tended form, must learn to be powerful enough to strike back to the attempts of those exploiters that have lost their power, and strive to regain it. (Finnish Communist Party, 1957)

This is certainly not the same interpretation of the people's power that the rest of the Finnish parties shared, nevertheless this statement confirms the people's power as an incontestable objective and basic value. The same republic that Kuusinen had rejected as a democracy, is now re-named as the dictatorship of the minority. As a dictatorship, the future 'workers' power' or the people's power can neither be the power of a divided people nor the power of quarrelling citizens. There is one people, which has one causal supremacy, a power which imposes order on its adversaries as well. The people's power thus means the accomplishment of the political program of the working class. The old republic means dictatorship, and the new dictatorship means democracy.

These odd verbal acrobatics were needed to resolve the double need to legitimize the state structure of the Soviet Union and at the same time to convince the Finnish constituency. In more practical issues of Finnish politics, the program does not hesitate to discuss workers 'democratic rights'. According to the program, municipalities have 'democratic self-government'. The trade union movement is considered to be one of the 'cornerstones of the people's power'. Step by step, the existence of the people's power is confirmed.

5. The Hegemony of the People's Power: the Left-wing

After the Second World War, a growing hegemony of the perspective of the people's power is undeniable. "The ideas concerning the people's power have been greatly clarified in our party since the Forssa Meeting [1903]", maintains the introduction to the manifesto of SDP (1952). The change of attitude concerns, above all, the point that after the war the prevailing republic was approved, without reservations, as a 'political democracy', or 'the people's power in the state'. Yet the political democracy was not enough, because
The power of money both in politics and culture is a known fact. Therefore, the freedom and leading power of the working class can be secured only by the unification of political democracy and socialism. By the means of democratic socialism, the capitalists' opportunities of utilizing economic power in politics are thwarted. (SDP, 1952)

The people's power in the state (valtiollinen kansanvalta) emphasizes – besides the loyalty to the constitution of the republic – the deficit of the people's power in society. 'The power of money' and 'economic power' function in the program are the counter-concepts of the genuine the people's power. The more the horizon of the people’s power becomes generally accepted in the manifestos, the more of a central obligation it is to name the most important deviations of this principle. The idiom 'the leading power of the working class' (työväenluokan johtovalta) is also an interesting rhetorical move. Clearly, it is a democratized equivalent to the communist ‘proletarian dictatorship’. At the same time, the idiom is reminiscent of the rule, according to which in only very rare occasions is it possible to demand pure ‘power’. A typical idiom is, instead, to require 'power of decision', 'power of conclusion', or influence (vaikutusvalta, 'power to effect'). This kind of strategic power is power to realize a respected policy. To demand power without any qualifiers, in contrast, is attached to the struggle for power and lust for power – which is easily understood as domination.

Finland People’s Democratic League (SKDL) was a post-war democratic front’ organization of the Finnish Communist Party. Since the mid-1960s, the league sought to increasingly distance itself from the Communist Party and its leading role. In 1967, the SKDL approved a new manifesto which was thoroughly pervaded by the vocabulary of the people's power. According to the program, the SKDL had even “acted as a stimulator of democratic (kansanvaltainen) development”. This formulation legitimizes two separate things. Besides the legitimizing of the good deeds of the league itself, it presumes and constructs as a fact that the SKDL has only accelerated a general democratic development' in Finland. The numerous idioms that use the people's power include, for instance, democratic practice, decision-making, democratic ideals, principles, freedom of speech, the economic democracy (the people's power), and finally, 'the people's com-
plete power. The manifesto supports the cooperation of the ‘democratic forces’, just as the SDP did in 1930. In accordance with the programs of the SDP, the manifesto complains that the people’s power does not yet extend to the economy, where an oligarchy prevails. Indeed, ‘economic oligarchy’ is a primary counter-concept of ‘the people’s power, just like ‘the concentration of power’. The old dilemma of the SKP is turned into an entirely new position, when socialism is portrayed as ‘the people’s economic power’:

Finland has reached the stage of development where the expansion of democracy, the progress towards the people’s total power (...) signifies a gradual transfer towards a socialist society system. (SKDL, 1967)

The SKDL now shares with the Social Democrats the view that has been realized to certain extent within the state and politics, and that the key demands concern the extension of this principle into the economic sphere. The manifesto does not leave its evaluation of the political institution of the republic overly vague:

The People’s Democratic League highly esteems the achievements of Finnish democracy, national independence, the unicameral parliament, universal suffrage, proportional representation, the freedom of association and the freedom of speech, as well as, the right to strike and the right to demonstrate. Essentially, they are expressly the consequences of the activities of the labor movement. (SKDL, 1967).

Here the SKDL resolves the problem of the legitimacy of the peoples’ power in two directions. With regard to the political divides born in the Civil War, the manifesto chooses without reservation the Social Democratic position and rejects the heritage of Otto Ville Kuusinen and the SKP. The manifesto makes this radical move, not to legitimize the bourgeois state as such, but rather to legitimize the political achievements of the workers’ movement. In order for the struggle of the working class to have been considered successful, however, the state could not have been essentially the mere dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as the SKP had maintained. Regarding the republic and the people’s power, the manifesto was a long step towards social democracy, the cooperation of the left, and thus towards eligibility for government. In that sense, the manifesto is a
momentous speech act both in terms of the immediate political situation and in terms of the long political heritage of the SKP/SKDL.

A similar, although more modest move was made at the 1969 party congress of the SKP. The new manifesto is generally characterized by growing richness of the vocabulary of power. The counter-concept of the people's power is no longer a totalizing 'bourgeois dictatorship' but typically 'the oligarchy of the big business', 'one-sided bourgeois supremacy' or 'economic oligarchy'. One can read here a clear move from essentialist conceptions of the state towards a slightly more empirical approach. The critical passage concerning 'the transitory state' was thoroughly re-formulated:

Such a state is the real the people's power that is set free from the narrow outlook of bourgeois democracy. It is power of the workers, socialist democracy where the working class is the leading power. (SKP, 1969)

No doubt, this statement documents a turn of almost 180 degrees after 1918. The people's power is not ridiculed, but it is desired. There is no trace of the romanticized 'iron dictatorship of the proletariat', instead the 'power of the workers' is defined as 'socialist democracy'. It was precisely this formulation that was among those that the Stalinist party minority was not able to approve. The party congress ended up in an open rupture, and there were prolonged attempts to 'unify' the party throughout the 1970s. As it goes, the minority never used the manifesto except as an example of revisionism. Still the passage carries with it traces of the past. The smooth equalizing of the people's power and 'the workers' power' implies the displacement of the less important elements of the people, and the conception of the workers as a pre-determined core and leader of the people.

6. The Hegemony of the People's Power: the Right-wing

A parallel development towards the acceptance of the vocabulary and the horizon of the people's power took place in the National
Coalition Party, a supporter of monarchy in the constitutional debate of 1918-19. The term democracy (*demokratia*) surfaces for the first time as late as in the program of 1970. Similarly, the people’s power is not at all at use in the manifestos of 1918, 1922 or 1945. The border against the Reds or revolutionaries was not drawn in these manifestos in terms of democracy or the people’s power. This seems to be connected to the larger phenomenon that ‘power’ did not, as a matter of fact, belong to the programmatic vocabulary of the Coalition Party before the 1960s. For example, in its manifesto of 1945, the party complains of how the “authority (*arvovalta*) of the law has been diminished”. The vocabulary of the people’s power enters, however, vigorously to the language of the party in the manifesto of 1957. The people’s power characterizes the state system, and it is the foundation for legal protection and independent legal system.

The government must reinforce the society and the *democratic* state system, to see to the unification of the people (...) Revolutionary communism, as well as any other activity that aims at changing the weakening our *democratic* state system, must be solidly resisted. Power aspirations that are contradictory to the constitution and foreign to the spirit of *democracy*, as well as, extraparliamentary activities targeted towards our governmental organs must be arrested. (National Coalition Party, 1957)

The people’s power is now a vital concept of *defense* and legitimacy. One has to protect and strengthen it. Revolutionary Communism is outlined as a threat to the people’s power. The ‘democratic state system’ aptly crystallizes this conception: it is primarily order and thus related to the ‘authority of law’ of the previous manifesto. Why did the Coalition Party not present these kinds of arguments earlier in its manifesto of 1945? Was there the threat that this kind of an emphasis on the people’s power could have merged into the ‘people’s democratic’ demands of the far left or to the general leftist wave? One possible explanation is that the leftist and agrarian rhetoric, which emphasized people and the people’s power, was such a major breakthrough that the Coalition Party had to follow. The main author of the manifesto, social scientist Onni Rantala, had familiarized himself with the new programs of the other conservative parties in
Nordic countries, and was thus able to modernize the outlook of the party (Aarnio, 1998, 65-67). This international impact, however, was translated into the old Finnish, republican language of the people's power. At any rate, by speaking about the people's power the party draws clear lines of defense and depicts the pursuits of the Communists alien to the spirit of the people's power.

In contrast to the traditional rhetoric of the left or Rural League, no demands for the democratization of any sphere of life are presented in this program. The people's power is not, therefore, any direction of development or distant goal, but a state of being which has to be protected. The concept does not, at least explicitly, cover any social power relations but exclusively the constitutional, state-related power relations. One can describe the situation by saying that over the four decades, the originally monarchist Coalition Party learned to turn its opponents' concept of demand into a better fitting concept of defense and legitimacy.

The concepts of power and democracy are increasingly used, in most parties, to define one's own political identity. For the Coalition Party, it was important to define revolutionary Communists as a threat to the people's power. The Finnish word for 'revolution', vallankumous, literally means 'reversal of the power'. It is interesting, that in its criticism of Communism, the program never uses the full term but systematically leaves the 'power' out. There is no power to be reversed in the first place, therefore the Communist action is just subversive, disruptive and negative. As late as in its manifesto of 1970, the party resists “all such action, which is aimed at changing our democratic (kansanvaltainen) system”. Democratic system is our order, and its opponents are thus advancing a foreign cause.

The Coalition Party’s programmatic relation to the people’s power changes again in the manifestos of 1981 and 1993. The previous perspective of defense disappears almost entirely. Instead, the manifesto legitimizes both the own party and the republic by assuming the people’s power as their key principle. Another substantial move takes place towards the Social Democratic and Agrarian/Center traditions:

Democracy must be extended to cover all significant forms of exercising power in the society.
From the standpoint of democracy, it is essential that the political and economic power is not centralized. (Coalition Party, 1981)

In this passage, both of the Finnish terms for democracy are used as synonyms. The first significant move is that here the Coalition Party steps outside of the pure constitutional discourse and discusses the theme that Social Democrats opened in 1903, namely, the social relations of power. Their concern for the concentration of power—which also used to be an exclusively a Social Democratic idiom before the 1960s and the breakthrough of new social sciences—emphasizes this point even further. Even though this change does not signify a substantial consensus among the largest parties (Coalition party, Centre Party, SDP, SKDL/The Left Alliance), it informs of the fact that their manifestos and therefore their official discourse principally covers the same field of phenomena. Thus the complete divide, which earlier on prevailed between entirely constitutional (The New Finns, The National Coalition Party) and entirely social (SDP, SKP) manifestos, was basically closed.

In its latest manifesto (1993), the Coalition Party extends the field of the people's power even further. Now it maintains that also the “eco-social market economy functions under democratic stewardship [kansanvaltaisessa ohjausseassa]”. The concentration of power as well as the trust in one, single solution is seen as threats to the people's power. The use of power is a problem, which may also turn into a threat to the people's power. The people's power requires that it will be cherished and developed towards various forms of participation. The rank order between democracy and the people's power is clearly and nicely formulated:

Democracy must be revised and the forms of a true people's power must be found for it. (Coalition Party, 1993)

Democracy receives its deeper meaning by assuming the forms of the genuine people's power. The people's power gives a warmer, cozier and more thickly national legitimacy than the more intellectual democracy. By assuming the themes of 'power' and 'democracy' extensively in its manifestos, the Coalition Party subscribed to the social scientific discourse, whose popularity had been growing since the
1960s. By choosing the people's power as one of the key concepts of its last two programs, the party evidently demonstrates its urge to compete with other parties in representation of the people, to define the people anew, and dissipate so its old and restricting links to the upper middle class.

The Centre Party (formerly the Rural League) has maintained the people's power as the key foundation of legitimacy throughout the years of Finnish independence. However, even within the Centre Party, the manifestos of 1980s exhibit an exceptional preoccupation with power and the people's power. The former chair and key writer of the manifestos, Paavo Väyrynen, belongs to the generation of the 1960s, and is therefore as interested in power as his leftist competitors. The program of 1982 projects democratic decision-making into history, as a part of 'the peasant culture of our country'. The concept travels thus into a time, when it was far from being a consciously or extensively shared value. The counter-concepts of the people's power are determined quite clearly:

Citizens feel powerless to influence decisions that concern them. On the other hand, the power of interest groups and experts threaten the basis of the people's power.

_The people's power_ must not be the _power of the majority_ in cases where the question is one of the basic values in life and opportunities in life of residents of remote districts. In the final analysis, only the people concerned can be experts in these issues. (Centre Party, 1982)

When the goal of the people's power is already generally accepted, a pure demand for democratization does not much politicize. Therefore, the parties try to name particular powers, which deviate from the people's power. Instead of challenging the Social Democrats and their trade unions directly, the power of interest groups is contested. Nominalization expands the political force of the argument. When opposing the straightforward power of majority, the Centre Party also questions the old conception of one and unified people as a person, and steps towards the direction of the power of the citizens. Apparently, the experts or members of interest groups do not posses such particularity, which should be protected against a majority power disguised as a people's power.
7. The Hegemony of the People’s Power: 
the Margins of the Republic

The Finnish Rural Party (Suomen maaseudun puolue, SMP) was a splinter of the bigger Rural League, and the fiercest and most successful representative of populist protest against the urbanization, ‘old parties’ and the President Urho Kekkonen (in office between 1956-1981). Because of the last point, it was often considered to represent far Right. Indeed, the rhetoric of the SMP (1967) elevated the people’s power onto the agenda during the time when the radical left preferred talking about democracy. The SMP and its first and foremost leader Veikko Vennamo have been the last agents who were successful in attaching the people’s power specifically to the ordinary and rural people: “Our party resists the supremacy of the big population centers and the capital”. The SMP retreats to the Communist tradition in the sense that the people’s power does not merely obtain a liberal, constitutional reference to a fair process, or a Social Democratic reference to a balanced division of social power, but the people’s power also means a distinct policy in managing the businesses of the country in the best interest of the people and in a way approved of by the people.

*Defending the people’s power* also requires that loopholes and wastefulness in using common funds is effectively stopped as well as that all other economic looting is obstructed. (SMP, 1967)

The people’s power means, thus, the monitoring of the life and economy of the political elite. Stylistically, the talk about ‘loopholes and wastefulness’ is aptly formulated, because the people’s power is now also folksy power. Most trenchantly, this observant criticism was aimed at the ‘old parties’:

Our Party stands unconditionally behind the democratic organizational machinery, and determinedly strives for the elimination of the oligarchy of party leadership, which has aptly succeeded in making the old parties powerless to realize the people’s democracy that they have promised in their programs.
Our Party categorically opposes the party subsidies that increases the power of the party leadership and has a demoralizing effect on the people’s power. (SMP, 1967)

Expertly, the manifesto positively acknowledges the manifestos of old parties that have called for the people’s power. But the ‘oligarchy of leadership’ in these parties prevents them causally from actualizing these manifestos. By requiring to the letter a democratic organizational machinery, the SMP steps forward to complete and advocate the best ideals of the old parties. A couple of times, the program emphatically defends ‘the sound democratic (kansanvaltainen) development’. This is clearly an attempt to express the worn idea of ‘the people’s real power’ in a fresh way. The Party does not even need to explicitly maintain that the prevailing democracy is not sound. When the left demanded at the very same time a democratization of various new fields of life, that is, a movement forward, the biological metaphor of soundness adheres to the sound past, which the party elites and election of Urho Kekkonen as the president of the republic have jeopardized. In this sense of defense, the manifesto draws near to the 1957 program of the Coalition Party.

In all of its populism, the rhetoric of the SMP is from an entirely different time than the 1930s’ programs of the extremist movements. Merely the transition from ‘party oligarchy’ to the ‘oligarchy of the party leadership’ is telling. The SMP does not attack the legitimacy of the parties as such, but maintains in a fairly sociological way that the party leaderships constitute a problematic oligarchy. Instead of looking for a strong head of state, the SMP formulated a developmental program for the people’s power and demanded, in particular, the narrowing of the power of president:

All power in our country must originate from the Finnish people. Therefore, the people must be able to vote in general elections for the parliament, the President of the Republic, and municipal councils. The term of office of the parliament and the municipal councils must be three years instead of the current four years. The President of the Republic must be elected by direct election and not through the electoral college (…) The same person may serve as the President of the Republic for no more than two consecutive terms, which means a maximum of twelve years. (SMP, 1967)
Except for the shortening of terms of the parliament, this program of reforming the republic has been actualized. The first sentence is an interesting modification of Finnish constitution (“Power in Finland belongs to the people”) and the old Anarchistic-cum-Leninist slogans (“All power to the councils”). By the external modality (“shall come from”), the text again creates a strong suspicion that the people’s power is not actually at work in Finland. The same demand about the terms and power of president, which was possible to make only in the margin in the 1960s, was generally accepted in the 1980s. Therefore, it might be reasonable to consider even the consequences of the party criticism of the SMP. The parties’ general interest in power, the people’s power and use of power in the 1980s informs of a decreasing legitimacy of party system. The SMP was early on challenging this legitimacy, not in order to subvert the republic, but in order to ridicule the competing parties. – Almost a similar, yet a more profoundly right-wing case was the Constitutional Party (1973).

When the extremist movements of the 1930s warred against the power of the parties, they wanted to weaken the parliament and elevate a head of the state instead. The opposition movements of the Kekkonen era protested against the same power of the parties, but they wanted complete the republican tradition by limiting the power of the president and the party leaderships and by strengthening the position of the parliament.

All of the major parties adopted the rhetoric of the people’s power towards the end of the 1960s. When even the most visible critics of the Kekkonen era resorted to the same concept, one can argue with good reason that the hegemony of the concept of the people’s power was established and consolidated over the 1960s and 1970s.

8. Breaks and Silences

The Swedish People’s Party (RKP) is the most significant deviation of this new hegemony – even if its name carries the element ‘people’. The reference of ‘the people’ in the Party name is rather ‘svenska folket’, the Swedish-speaking folk, than the unitary people. Democracy (demokratia) surfaces in its manifestos once in 1937, but as a
proper ground of legitimacy and evaluation in the manifestos of 1964, 1974 and 1988. In this sense, the change in RKP's manifestos parallels the birth of the outlined hegemony. However, why is the people's power lacking so consequently? Of course, these programs are translated from Swedish to Finnish. If this is the reason, it however informs us of a consistent difference between the two Finnish words for democracy. As early as in 1880, the program of the Liberal Party ascribed the discontent of the Swedish-speaking intellectuals to the concept of the people's power. In 1918-1919, the triumphant republicans succeeded better in monopolizing the rhetoric of the people's power. In the right-wing rhetoric of the 1930s, the 'people' of the people's power was problematically one and a solid subject, a horizon within which the Swedish-speaking minority run the risk of being silenced. The recourse to the language minority (not the Finnish people), partly to the old elite (not the ordinary people) and to the bourgeois side of the political field (not the working class people) gives manifold reasons to avoid the rhetoric of the people's power.

Surprisingly, the terms are non-existent in the manifesto of Left Alliance (1990), a party which was established to gather the citizens left from the Social Democrats after the collapse of Communist Party. The manifesto is rich of complex vocabulary of power. The power relationships attached to gender, economy as well as to the position of the parliament and the president are discussed. As for the people's power, the most telling demand is this:

*The exercise of power* that is based on citizens' own activity must be encouraged in every way, and new possibilities and forms must be created for it. (Left Alliance, 1990)

The old leftist program of democratization (*kansanvaltaistaminen*) has emptied itself on two different levels. Both the SKDL and SKP had already acknowledged the constitutional merits of the people's power — in comparison with the dictatorship of proletariat — twenty years earlier, and in this manifesto the current theme was a direct criticism of the Soviet power. On the other hand, the rhetoric of the people's power had become so widely and routinely employed, that
it hardly politicized anything. The manifesto seems thus to presume the constitutional democracy as self-evident, and looks for other arguments of politicization.

Be it as it may, but the most important programmatic change seems to signify a rhetorical change from the power of the (potentially one) people to the emphasis of power of the citizens. In Finnish, this is a pun, because the word ‘citizen’ (hansalainen) contains the word people (kansa). In a similar way, the manifesto of the SDP (1987) presents the slogan “to the participatory power of the citizens”. The Greens (1990) adapted the same idea by maintaining that a proper ecological change can take place only “with the power of the citizens and by enlarging the liberties”.

The people’s power seems to be moving to the background with the general consensus. At the same time when the Coalition Party assumes the rhetoric profusely and without presentations, the leftist parties and the Greens seem to move towards emphasizing the power of the citizens. Yrjö Koskinen’s old folk-as-a-person has apparently come to the end of its journey, after invigorating the political discourses of the old Finnish Party, extreme right (in the 1930s), extreme left (before the 1960s) and the SMP. During this journey, ‘the people’ has lost most of its connotations as ‘the ordinary people’, and has thus approved of the clerical people of the Coalition Party. At the same time, it has lost much of the political edge of the forgotten and oppressed people.

One reason for the disappearing force of the people’s power is in the settling down of the constitutional debate. Since the 1930s, there has been no serious attempt at a monarchic revanche. President Urho Kekkonen’s long term in office (1956-1981), and the concentration of unofficial power to enable him to intervene in public discourse, the functioning of the government, administration and even political parties, launched a twenty year long process of changing the constitution towards more parliamentarian and republican direction. The ironies of history include the fact that Kekkonen came from one the key republican parties, Rural League, and that the other leading republican party, Social Democrats, were partly retarding this development, because they have been victorious in all presidential elections since Kekkonen era. Be it as it may, but in the discussion about
‘the power in Finland’, the constitutional discourse is losing its edge. One decisive moment in this long process was the end of the 1960s, when the Communist party and SKDL acknowledged the existence of the political and constitutional democracy in Finland. The Social Democrats had made the same move in 1930.

If the left has been renouncing its reservations with the political democracy, it has, at the same time, successfully introduced (with the Rural League) another way of discussing power and the people’s power: the power relations of economy and civil society. The Finnish right did not acknowledge this discourse before the political trend of the 1960s. To my understanding, a key factor introducing this ‘social democratic’ change in the political discourse was the breakthrough of modern sociology and political science into the public arena during the 1960s. The “realist school” of political science was determined to study the actual relations of power, not only the normative or constitutional relations (Jansson 1964). Behavioralistic sociology legitimized the talk about concentration of power and power relations in all fields of life.

The results of this survey reveal the fairly astonishing fact that ‘democracy’ and ‘the people’s power’ were not accepted as a self-evident basis of political evaluation and legitimizing before the 1960s. The turn towards a more ‘democratic’ rhetoric contains a strong Social Democratic-cum-sociological undercurrent, which has legitimized the discourse of social power relations. When power was, at least until the 1950s, an indelicate and impertinent term to be discussed publicly or in educated company, it has now permeated all public political discourses. Does it mean that the political edge of detecting and naming new ‘powers’ will diminish in future the same way as the force of the people’s power has been impaired over the last decades? Not necessarily. Instead of just repeating the mantra of the people’s power or naming the possessors of the power, the programs that strive to politicize seem to be interested in the temporal movements of power: power is concentrating, it is escaping from the citizens, it slides away, it disappears. Who is first to complain of the general lack of power?
Notes

1 The Finnish Christian League (SKL) presents a bit different case. Its two
manifestoes (1979, 1995) do not resort to the rhetoric of the people's
power. In this case, the reason is rather the Lutheran language of Obrigkeit.
People must obey the authorities, set by God, and not believe in the
souvereign people's power.

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