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Observations on Arendt, Kant and the Autonomy of Political Judgement

Hannah Arendt is one of the important authors who have radically questioned conventional philosophical views on politics. Her conviction was that a foundationalist and cognitivist philosophy of politics, which in various forms has very much dominated the tradition, suggests a fatally misguided picture of the political. For Arendt, the Platonic move from the cave, from doxa to episteme, is a move from a political space to metaphysics and there is, or should be, no way back to a theory of the political. In Arendt’s paradigm it is Socrates who as gadfly and midwife practiced political judgement publicly and pressed his fellow citizens to do the same. Arendt tends to contrast Socrates’ activity as a major threat to the dominant power elite with Plato’s founding of the Academy in order to do theoria.

Since Plato such metaphysical views on politics and political philosophy have been defended, e.g., in numer-
ous theories of natural law as well as in versions of modern liberalism and socialism. Common to them is the idea of politics as a part, and usually as a subordinate part, of some larger social, historical and conceptual totality. In some way or another the principles of the political are derived from a non-political source. One could perhaps call these views naturalistic by making an analogy with ethical naturalism, which has defined the ethical or moral in metaphysical, theological, biological, sociological, linguistic etc. terms.

There have been attempts, however, to think of political life as well as thought in terms of politics itself. One may in fact already find elements of a conception of politics from Aristotle in terms *phronesis*, i.e. of an ability to deliberate and act prudentially in political questions or situations – although it can also be maintained that for him, politics is just one part of a larger practical totality aiming at the realization of *eudaimonia*. In ethics, at least, Aristotle argues for a kind of naturalism. Additionally, there are authors like Machiavelli, Burke, de Tocqueville and Nietzsche who have all criticized the conventional philosophical discourses on political principles and truths, suggesting a more radical autonomy of the political.

These critical perspectives, Aristotle’s included, have aroused major interest during the last few decades while the foundationalist theories of politics have been under various attacks and deconstructions. Even though authors like Machiavelli, de Tocqueville and Nietzsche certainly have operated with varying motives and diverse conceptual strategies, the aspiration to perceive politics as something rather self-sustaining or autonomous is common to them all. Thus, they all tend to oppose reductions or translations of political ‘principles’ into non-political terms, be it metaphysics, religion, economics, sociology, or moral philosophy. Instead, politics as a mode of common deliberation, or perhaps as a kind of art, is interpreted in its
own terms. One should be especially careful not to reduce principles or rules of political action into cognitive or epistemic rules, which would then supply a universally rational foundation for political decisions.¹

But if the constitutive and normative rules for political action and discourse should not be derived or justified from any non-political source, they must somehow be generated within the political space. And if that space is itself without a hierarchical structure or a foundation, as it seems to be for these thinkers, then the principles for political deliberation, action and discourse have to be produced in the course of the political action or discourse itself. This is essentially the problematics to which many of the questions concerning political judgement are related. If politics should be thought of as something autonomous and self-sustaining, then how should we conceive the political judgements? If in practising political judgement it is not possible to find orientation in the form of a cognitive or moral judgements, then what are such self-sustaining political judgements.

These kinds of questions are also relevant in Hannah Arendt’s work. It is questionable whether she herself would have thought of them in these terms, because for her there could be no theory of political judgement. But in any case the current interest in her work indicates its relevance for discussions concerning the principles of the political and political judgement. In the following, I will first briefly outline how Arendt’s highly original thought on the autonomy of political questions develops. Secondly, I will discuss her views on political judgement and comment on some of her interpretations of Kant’s *Kritik der Urteilskraft* as containing a theory of an autonomous political judgement. My comments on these topics are partly critical. Finally, I will briefly endorse a more holistic picture of political judgement with its connections to cognitive and moral judgements.
Arendt and the Autonomy of Political Judgement

Hannah Arendt's thoughts on the principles of political action and discourse are certainly of major importance. However, the frame in which she discusses questions related to them is highly peculiar and also highly variable, making her even more difficult to conceive. For Arendt traditional political philosophy has in fact little to say about politics because it has discussed politics so much in terms of knowledge, thus disguising the specific dynamics of political action and thought. The model for Arendt's conception of political space is of classical Greek and Roman origin, not modern. Politics for Arendt is a matter of action and judgement in a public space within the human world. Her ways of conceiving politics change, not so much because of this model, but rather because she becomes increasingly pessimistic about the possibilities of the political, i.e. of its application in the modern world. For her, social and economical activities and institutions become increasingly dominant in the modern world. Thus, as far as modernity tends to close political space, it becomes totalitarian. Not only the Holocaust, after which the human condition in general could no longer be thought as it had been, but mass-society as whole seemed to exclude the individual ability to think and judge politically and express public responsibility towards others in common affairs.

Thus, Arendt's theory of the political space is inherently a critique of modernity where the social, with its privatizing influences on the common world, becomes increasingly dominant. Analogously, her insistence on the autonomy of political judgement and action is simultaneously a commentary on the corruption of judgement in our time. Seen from this perspective then, her book on totalitarianism and the Eichmann-book are among her most
essential contributions on thinking the political judgement. In addition to material about the collective decay of judgement, they contain some positive examples of the exercise of political judgement.  

In *The Human Condition* one does not yet find an unequivocal picture of Arendt’s views on the notion of political judgement. There she introduces certain conditions for her view while distancing from foundationalist and historicist theories, presenting the sphere of actions as radically separate from those of work and labour. In many ways her distinctions follow Aristotle, but above all the Aristotelian idea of the *polis* as an ethical community seems alien to Arendt. This is perhaps so because she eventually writes about modern times and could not imagine what such a community would presently mean. Even more generally, she emphasizes the plurality of the political in the sense that it tends to exclude all versions of ethical and political communitarianism. In any case, Arendt’s notion of political action, as many commentators have noted, contains inner tensions and is quite difficult to apply. In the first place, she could exemplify it further by such exceptional situations as revolutions or founding states. Or, what she increasingly does in her later work, by restraining the practice of political judgement to the perspective of a spectator. 

Arendt’s last work *The Life of the Mind* contains some more answers to questions about the nature of the political. One of the distinctions, which is essential to understanding her notion of political judgement, lies between logical reasoning and cognition on the one hand and thinking on the other. This distinction is already presented in *The Human Condition*, but it is developed even further and made systematic use of in the first volume of *The Life of the Mind*. Behind this distinction there is the more general contrast between intellect and thinking, which is Arendt’s version of Kant’s contrast between understand-
ing and reason. While intellect works with the necessary conditions of knowledge, “thinking deals with invisibles, with representations of things that are absent”.\(^5\) Opposed to knowledge, thinking fabricates meanings and stories upon which the other noncognitive faculties of mind, willing and judging, are essentially dependent. These latter faculties are essential to understanding political action.

Reasoning for Arendt means a kind of labor of the intellect which may be applied to various materials; it is formal, unreflective, repetitive and consists of strict rules, procedures and proofs. It is very dissimilar to political judgement. On the other hand, cognition for Arendt is a kind of intellectual work that is directed towards certain goals. It is thus teleological and instrumental activity which aims at establishing useful economic, technical, historical, psychological etc. truths. It produces knowledge and it, too, is very different from what, in her view, political judgement is about. Finally, by thinking Arendt means something not quite so remote from political action. For thinking is not instrumental, not directed towards external goals, not established by some methods or rules. In Arendt’s view, one does not think in order to prove anything in the logical sense, nor in order to develop a piece of knowledge. Thinking consists of thoughts, it gives rise to works of art and to – new thoughts. Its model is the use of reason in the Kantian sense, not understanding.

For Arendt there is a close connection between thinking, acting and judging. For her judging is a kind of thinking that takes place in the political space. Thus neither thinking nor judging is oriented towards discovering some truths inside or outside the political space. In her essay ‘Thinking and moral consideration’, Arendt writes: if “thinking, the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue, actualizes the difference within our identity as given in our consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its by-product, the judging, the by-product of the liberating ef-
fect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances... The Manifestation of thought is not knowledge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly.” Thus, for Arendt politics is not about knowledge and truths, but rather it is about sharing interpretations and meanings, sharing values and norms, views on good and bad, right and wrong, views that make possible common deliberation and action. In this context Arendt says that political thinking and judgements aim at “the world of appearances”, i.e. at a kind of public communicability. Political thinking and judging cannot be accomplished individually in the same sense in which one can reason and cognize alone. Political judgements aim at a meaningful assertion about an action or situation, and the validity of those judgements is rather particular and specific than universal. Judgements aim at understanding and interpreting situations, not at connecting them with any universal truths.

Consequently, one cannot give any strict proof or a demonstration of one’s political judgement. At most, one may give good grounds, arguments, or “reasons”, and in doing so one may attempt to persuade one’s listeners or readers. Political judgements presuppose a communality which Arendt, following above all Kant’s discussion on the judgements of taste, calls ‘common sense’. By this she conveys that people tend, or perhaps should tend, to see political issues at least to some degree in the same way and to share interpretations. If they do not share any opinions and interpretations of meanings concerning the world of appearances, it becomes very difficult to imagine how they could judge and act politically. For Arendt, common sense is obviously both a presuppositions and a result of practising political judgement, of what she, following Kant calls, “enlarged mentality”.

It is not easy to characterize Arendt’s overall view on political judgement, because her writing contains several
tensions. Most notably there is the tension between actor’s and spectator’s perspectives, which only partly corresponds to the tension between her earlier and later thinking. In a way, she seems to mean that these are two perspectives which everyone has to make use of, but she expands on this idea much more in her later work. In *The Human Condition* she maintains that politics should be dealt with in terms of action and as part of *vita activa*, not of *vita contemplativa*. For only in this way one is able to understand the incompleteness, impermanence and radical contingency characteristic to political action as distinguished from the spheres of labor and work. Only by admitting the ultimate unpredictability and plurality of the political space may one understand what politics is about. If one attempts, as philosophers traditionally have done, to construe and justify a ‘view from nowhere’ to the sphere of political action, one inevitably looses touch with the political.

However, this is only one side of Arendt’s thoughts on politics. In *The Life of the Mind*, and especially in its unfinished ending on Kant and judgement, she discusses politics mainly from the perspective of a spectator who seems to be fairly detached from political actions and responsibilities. In this work, she discusses political judgement as something belonging to the life of the mind, i.e. in some sense as belonging to the *vita contemplativa*. Her growing skepticism towards possibilities of practising political judgement and acting on judgements in the contemporary world may be among her motives for this move more away from first person perspective of actors, to the more distanced perspective of a spectator. On the other hand, one may speculate, perhaps she was merely changing her theoretical perspective. In any case, one may read the book on Eichmann trial as well as her reflections on the connections between modernity and totalitarianism as also documenting her motives for this tendency to think of politics in more distanced and also, in a sense, in more tragic terms.
Arendt’s Reading of Kant and the Autonomy of the Political Judgement

In some sense, *The Life of the Mind* with its triple structure of thinking, willing and judging is parallel to Kant’s three critiques. However, there are also severe differences between them. First of all, Arendt builds a very strong contrast between cognition and thinking: “To expect truth to come from thinking signifies that we mistake the need to think with the urge to know... Truth is what we are compelled to admit by nature either of our senses or of our brain”, she writes. Although the distinction between *Denken*, *Erkennen* and *Wissen* is important for Kant’s critique of dogmatic metaphysics and skepticism, one cannot construe such an opposition from his work. In fact, Kant’s first critique deals on the whole with questions of cognition, i.e. of knowledge and rational faith. Comparably, Arendt’s treatment of willing is mainly historical and does not have much to do with Kant’s metaphysics of pure and good will as the only possible foundation for universal morality and practical freedom. This radical moral demand is virtually absent from Arendt’s work. In Arendt’s lectured version of the volume on judging she discusses various questions related to her ideas about Kant’s political thinking, but begins a systematic discussion of the third critique no sooner than the tenth session (of thirteen). Consequently, the relations between various faculties are in fact not at all modelled along the Kantian architectonics.

Although it was clearly not Arendt’s intention to produce in any sense a faithful interpretation of Kant, but rather to make use of certain Kantian thoughts, conceptions and distinctions in her original thinking, it is meaningful and informative to point out some of the differences in their contributions. Through such differences one may see Arendt more clearly. A major part of Kant’s
critical philosophy may be read as a transcendental theory of various forms of judgement. The cognitive judgements are most fundamental to his critical project, at least in the sense that philosophy as a theory of judgements ultimately is a cognitive enterprise. Moral judgements, however, have the highest status in the whole architectonics of Kant’s philosophy, because his image of the world is ultimately a moral one.\textsuperscript{11} The much debated question is, then, what is the status of the aesthetic and teleological judgements in relation to willing and thinking.

These judgements, which Kant studies in his \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, are reflective, i.e. they do not determine or subsume their object under a concept, but rather grope after principles in the practice of judgement itself. Thus, unlike cognitive and moral judgements, their universality is not conceptual. What Kant explains when he develops his solution to the antinomy of taste is much weaker. But although for Kant, aesthetic and teleological judgements are autonomous in relation to determinative judgements, his intention clearly is to indicate how they are both morally and cognitively significant and may support other types of judgement.\textsuperscript{12}

In \textit{Kritik der Urteilskraft}, Kant examines such phenomena which do not fit into the frames of the two first critiques because of their inner purposiveness. In the first part he studies aesthetic phenomena which are subjectively purposive, and in the latter part he studies above all phenomena of organic nature which is objectively purposive. He is not adopting any classical teleological notion of beauty or life here, however, for he maintains that we only have “purposiveness without a purpose”. We cannot know and explain these phenomena by appealing to their purposes, i.e. by formulating determinate judgements about them. Instead we must operate with reflective judgements, without universals under which we could subsume the particulars. With such judgements we attempt
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to reach something universal or general, but not in the
cognitive or moral sense.

According to Kant, in an aesthetic judgement a flower,
e.g., arouses in us a spiritual delight, an experience of
purposiveness, which is caused by a free play of our men-
tal capacities. Secondly, for Kant an aesthetic judgement
is not based on sensual pleasure, as some British empiri-
cists had thought. It is based on reflection, and it is ex-
actly for this reason that there is a special form of subjec-
tive universality inherent in these judgements. Finally, Kant
maintains that aesthetic judgements are disinterested, i.e.
neither our mental nor physical well-being is directly af-
fected by them. Whereas understanding is the faculty for
cognitive judgements and reason for moral ones, imagina-
tion is the capacity which is at work in the free lawfulness
characteristic to aesthetic judgements.

Arendt became increasingly fascinated with *Kritik der
Urteilskraft* because she obviously detected there a theory
of judgement as an autonomous faculty in respect to know-
ing and willing. For her, politics and public fabrication of
cultural meanings are the major contexts for practising
judgement. There are especially three interconnected
themes in Kant’s book which interested her from a politi-
cal point of view:13 First there is the connection between
the plurality specific to the political space and the spe-
cific universality or generality of judgements of taste. In
developing his answer to the antinomy of taste, Kant, too,
appeals to the notion of common sense, but he gives it a
complicated and peculiar interpretation.14

Kant maintains that some kind of common sense must
be presupposed if an aesthetic judgement is claimed to
have general validity within a community. He writes:
“...they must have a subjective principle, which determines
only by feeling rather than by concepts, though nonethe-
less with universal validity, what is liked or disliked. Such
a principle, however, could only be regarded as a com-
mon sense". Kant and Arendt understand this notion rather differently. Kant emphasizes that by common sense he does not “mean an outer sense, but...the effect arising from the free play of our cognitive powers”, i.e. a transcendental condition of the general validity of judgements of taste. The validity of these judgements is not conceptual but “exemplary”, like that of “an ideal standard”. Arendt, on the other hand, understands common sense more in empirical as a presupposition and consequence of judgements. Thus she writes: “One judges always as a member of a community, guided by one's community sense, one's sensus communis. But in the last analysis, one is a member of a world community by the sheer fact of being human; this is one's ‘cosmopolitan existence’." She tends to distinguish further between its ideal and corrupted forms. In every case, she is far from reflecting and arguing transcendently in the Kantian sense.

The second important theme for Arendt is the particularity of political judgements. A political judgement should not subsume its object under a general concept, but should leave it in its particularity, just as an aesthetic judgement (“This rose is beautiful”) does according to Kant. Such a judgement renders its object an exemplary validity, just as judgement about significant political issues or events should do in Arendt’s opinion. This is analogous to the principle of plurality which according to Arendt is most essential to politics. One should be aware, however, that Kant is really arguing for the transcendental conditions of aesthetic judgements, whereas Arendt is speaking about political judgements on a fairly empirical level. Arendt implies that such a plurality would necessarily be excluded from the cognitive and moral discourses, but it is very difficult to say in what sense this could be Kant’s opinion. Similarly, the question of what Kant himself would have thought about such an analogy of aesthetic and political judgements remains open.
Thirdly, Arendt emphasizes the primacy of the retrospective perspective of a spectator in respect to the perspective of actors. For her this is analogous to the contrast on the aesthetic level between taste and genius, or judgement and activity. In her reading of Kant only a spectator could legitimately be impressed by the French revolution, whereas all those who had prepared for it were condemned. For Arendt, the fascination with the idea of reading Kant’s aesthetics as a theory of political judgement is essentially connected with the melancholy and even tragic figure of a distanced spectator. As an intellectual, she herself identified more with the spectator, whom Kant describes when he comments on the French Revolution.

Arendt writes, quoting Kant: “Assuming that history is nothing but the miserable story of mankind’s eternal ups and downs, the spectacle of sound and fury ‘may perhaps be moving for a while; but the curtain must eventually descend. For in the long run, it becomes a farce. And even if the actors do not tire of it – for they are fools – the spectator does, for any single act will be enough for him if he can reasonably conclude from it that the never-ending play will be of eternal sameness.” For Arendt herself the important point is that from the spectator’s perspective there are only very thin lines between judgement and action. For her interpreters, however, this point has caused great difficulties.

Why should we after all confine the possibility of a genuine political judgement only to the perspective of a historian, a storyteller, or a passive spectator? It is in fact difficult to make sense of this thought in general terms. In any case, this is by no means Kant’s entire opinion on the matter. Arendt, however, is insistent in her understanding this idea from Kant: “The spectator, not the actor, holds the clue to the meaning of human affairs – only, and this is decisive, Kant’s spectators exists in plu-
ral, and this is why he could arrive at a political philoso-
phy.\textsuperscript{21} Arendt almost completely skips Kant's "official"
political philosophy, i.e. his historical and political writ-
ings and especially \textit{Metaphysik der Sitten} where Kant dis-
cusses politics from the moral point of view. Instead she
proposes the idea of his aesthetics as the source of a
theory of political judgement. This idea has certainly
proved fruitful and has been developed further by Vollrath,
Beiner and others.\textsuperscript{22} Her reasons for this insistence mainly
have to do with her \textit{Weltanschauung}, however, i.e. with her
emphatic claim that politics, after all, is a matter of judg-
ing appearances, not any purposes or concrete situations.
Behind this view is her judgement about the collective
crisis of meaning and judgement in the contemporary age,
when the economic and social modes of behaviour gain
ever more dominance.

It is thus fair to say, I think, that Arendt's discussion
of Kant is not intended, and should not be read, as a
faithful explication of his political philosophy but rather
as an original contribution of a sympathetic reader.\textsuperscript{23}
Although she makes several important points in her \textit{Lectures},
which have initiated a new way of reading his "inofficial"
political philosophy\textsuperscript{24}, she seems to build her discussion
on Kant's political philosophy on distinctions and premises
that only partly could have been conceded by Kant him-
self — or more broadly, would have found a place within
his moral image of the world of human beings. Generally,
Arendt operates with such stringent distinctions between
knowledge, morality and judgement that all of the possi-
bilities for cooperation between them seem to be closed.
For her, as we have seen, questions of knowledge are
radically distinct from questions of thinking and judge-
ment. Although Kant himself is also famous for his sharp
distinctions it is beyond dispute that during the 1790's he
was striving to indicate how the various faculties of the
mind may cooperate and how different spheres of culture
could support each other in efforts to promote its ultimate moral ends.25

Arendt, on the other hand, thinks that there is eventually only one faculty of judgement in the proper sense, i.e. a reflective judgement. It may be practised aesthetically, politically or perhaps in other ways, but she never in fact employs the terms ‘aesthetic’ or ‘political judgement’.26 The difference from Kant is very clear indeed. While Kant is thinking of how to make his moral image of the world more explicit in ‘the world of appearances’ and how to find Übergänge – a notion which he elaborates systematically in his Opus postumum – e.g. from his causal picture of nature to the demands of cognizing living organisms or principle of human history, Arendt is indicating that the unitary faculty judgement is basically autonomous or independent of the cognitive and moral considerations. This fundamental difference is also present in their different perspectives on the autonomy of the political, as well as in Arendt’s insistence of the melancholy and even “tragic” figure of the spectator.

From the perspective of such a spectator, Arendt passes her judgement on the Eichmann-trial, with the central claims concerning the prevailing thoughtlessness and the resulting banality of evil. It is difficult to speculate on Kant’s possible judgements in such a case, but it is sure, I think, that he would not have expressed his judgement in these terms.27 Kant would probably have said much more about our moral obligations, which one cannot escape even as an actor in a situation where people’s sense of those obligation seem to be terribly weak.
Notes

1 See e.g. Steinberger (1993), 1-47.
3 To mention one, Passerin d’Entrèves (1994) argues in his impressive book that she conceives political action on the one hand as tending towards communicative and participatory democracy, and on the other hand as tending towards a expressivistic and heroic notion of politics. In *The Human Condition* the latter tendency is dominant, whereas in the book *On Revolution* the former dominates, but according to his reconstruction Arendt never resolved this tension.
4 See *The Human Condition*, 168-174; *Thinking*, 45-65.
5 *Thinking*, 193.
6 *Thinking and Moral Consideration: A Lecture*, 446.
7 See esp. *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 40-41.
8 In *Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy*, 27 she summarizes: “Men (in plural JK) = earthbound creatures, living in communities, endowed with common sense, *sensus communis*, a community sense; not autonomous, needing each other’s company even for thinking (“freedom of the pen”) = first part of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. See also *Thinking*, esp. p. 50.
9 *Thinking*, 61.
10 Wellmer suggests that Arendt’s position is “in accord with modern mainstream epistemology, even if in naturalized guise. The “brain” stands for logical deduction and demonstration, the “senses” for empirical evidence or sensual intuition” (Wellmer 1993, 318). Wellmer maintains, importantly, that Arendt is caught up with the “the model of a singular cognitive subject (or organism) confronting an external world which leaves its imprints in the internal representations of this subject, the corresponding primacy of cognition over language, and the idea of rational compulsion or logical proof”, from which, then, follows the compulsion to locate “the common world of men opened up by speech, the world of politics and poetry, of thinking and judging, beyond and above the sphere of cognition” (318–319). As far as he implies that this model with its strong dualisms come from Kant, I disagree with him.
11 See esp. Henrich (1992)
12 In the contemporary debates on the relations between moral and aesthetic judgements there are indeed various positions: some of them present the latter as irrelevant for the former, some marginal, some as compensating, some as perfectioning, some fundamental. Most of these positions appeal also to Kant, thus creating a very incongruous picture of him. See Früchtl (1996).
14 Josef Früchtl (1996), 423-444 has a very good discussion of its various aspects.
15 Kant, *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 238; *Critique of Judgement*, 87.
17 *Lectures*, 75-76.
19 Thinking, 95; italics by Arendt. The Kant-passage is from the essay On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, but It Does not Apply in Practice'.
20 See esp. Steinberger (1993), who quite convincingly argues for a conception of political judgement combining cognitive, moral and political elements from a reflective perspective of the actor.
21 Thinking, 96.
22 I find especially noteworthy Schmitz (1990), 413-434, where the author argues convincingly that the great majority of Kant’s articles in *Zum Ewigen Frieden* may be justified from the imperative of *Klugheit*, i.e. that or enlarged way of thinking, instead of the categorical imperative.
23 This is emphasized by Beiner (1994), and especially Beiner (1997).
24 The distinction between Kant “official” and “inofficial” political doctrines come from Ernst Vollrath (1977, 1987) who has made a major work in developing further the Arendtian ideas.
25 On the connections between his ethics and *Kritik der Urteilskraft* see esp. the important book of Guyer (1993).
As Henry E. Allison has shown, Arendt understood Kant's discussion on evil metaphysically in the sense it was not intended, which at least partly explains the curious phrase of the “banality” of evil. See Allison (1996), 169-182.

Bibliography

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